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In this paper, I intend to investigate the specific nature of moral crisis and whether or 
not a moral crisis is, strongly, different in kind from a moral disagreement or, more weakly, a 
special case of moral disagreement. A moral conflict is a disagreement about the truth of a 
statement or an assertion and its resolution will not necessarily (but may) involve normative 
and practical consequences: a change in law, social institutions or individual behaviour. 
Intuitively, crisis is initially comprehended as a crucial or decisive temporal moment which is 
unstable and characterized by a conflict awaiting resolution that will result in a critical 
revision of central values. Crisis, one may suppose, differs from simple moral disagreement 
because of the urgency of its resolution. It is not just disagreement, it is an urgent 
disagreement, in that it is a demand that can quite quickly spill over into political action. The 
resolution of a moral crisis, whether it be different in kind from or a special subset of moral 
disagreement, may well lead to normative and practical consequences. 
 
Characterizing the Nature of Moral Crisis 
 
Crises are nearly always material or historical facts, such as the demand by women for 
the vote pre-1918 (in the UK), and the lobbying for the Abortion Act of 1967. In both of 
these cases, customary or traditional values were pitted against “progressive” or rational 
reasons and the moral demand was accompanied by political action (protest, disobedience, 
violence). Had the demand been made historically earlier, it is not uncontroversial to assume 
that it would have been silenced; that is, it would not have counted as a demand, because the 
interests it expressed had no “rational” correlative in the dominant moral language. What they 
said would not have counted as words. So, the women who demanded a vote were seen as 
“hysterical” or “unnatural” and therefore “unreasonable” and “irrational” until the culture of 
reason could accept their demand as intelligible (in the UK around the turn of the 20th 
century).1 And such denial of the demands of the women would have been supported by 
conventional meanings of the social fabric (it is natural for women to occupy the home) and 
more sophisticated metaphysical positions (the religious separation of gendered duties). 
However, at the same time, moral crises are distinguished by the protester's voice 
harmonizing with deeper central values of a culture. The demands are not so easily silenced 
as those of the hysterical and the idiosyncratic. Crises are interesting because the demand 
made cannot be easily dismissed by the dominant moral discourse because the crisis reveals a 
conflict at the heart of the language. With both examples above, the emergence of the 
rationality of the values of liberty and equality comes into conflict with the wider moral 
                                                          
1 Langton sees this as a true cultural problem as concerns contemporary feminism. The voice of women is 
“silenced” because their assertions are not considered assertions at all, but the statements of the deluded, the 
emotional, the hysterical and so on. See Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography 
and Objectification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 1. 
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language that supports them. The demand for the right to vote made an appeal to central 
values, equality and liberty, which come into conflict with the traditional metaphysical and 
religious commitments of the culture. Oddly, though, those very values of equality and liberty 
were founded in and extrapolated from that very particular moral tradition. Equally so in the 
case of abortion whereby reproductive technological advances, egalitarian policies and the 
secularization of society mean women have for the first time a demand to take their own body 
as self-owned. Here the values of autonomy and private property are also to a large extent 
derived from a specific moral tradition.2 
 Crisis, it seems, reveals the broken nature of moral culture and occurs when that 
language is in need of revision. It is distinguished from other moral problems in that its 
resolution is characterized by urgency and the willingness of the agents to risk for their 
demands to be met. Compare the movements for female suffrage with the moral problem of 
assisted suicide. If the government were to enforce a law against assisted suicide, one may 
well disagree and assert that it rests on moral error, but be unwilling to use political action to 
demand that politicians recognize their error. The conflict is just not urgent enough to 
demand political action in the case of disagreement. Moral crises, on the other hand, are very 
much characterized by the need to resolve them practically as well as theoretically and such 
disagreements are often accompanied by political and practical action. 
Let us take two steps back here to dissect the nature of moral disagreements which are 
best understood as a crisis. A disagreement in moral discourse is characterized by a conflict 
between individuals or groups who claim that “it is right to X” in contradiction of others. So, 
“it is right for women to have the right to vote” and “it is right that women do not have the 
right to vote”. It is assumed that, like science, such questions are susceptible to resolution and 
are not, like desires or preferences, arational. To reduce the question to a conflict of 
preferences and not reasons is to make it akin to two agents arguing over whether cheese is 
delicious or not. Such conflicts can only be resolved through force and coercion, not reason, 
and ultimately undermine an appropriate understanding of moral discourse.  
Moral crisis is therefore akin to moral disagreement in that there exists a felt conflict 
between shared values of a culture. As has been mentioned, the values of equality and liberty 
which ground the demand for universal suffrage are the very values of the tradition which 
they oppose. The traditional interpretation of these values and the progressive interpretation 
of the values of a culture are in opposition, so one could describe the rational axiology of a 
culture as conflicted.  
Over and above a simple moral disagreement, a moral crisis seems to be very much 
historically situated. The disagreement over whether lying is ever permissible is ahistorical. 
However, had women demanded the vote in the sixteenth century, their claim would have 
been unintelligible at the level of the dominant public, rational culture due to its incoherence 
with deeply shared metaphysical, religious and ethical commitments. In the twentieth 
century, the demand for the vote is intelligible because it harmonizes with rational values that 
are shared: equality, liberty and a new cultural fabric that grounds these values (the secular, 
industrial world). The claim is grounded in values that are undeniable to the opponents of the 
claimant; the participants now speak the same moral language and hence the progressive 
interlocutor has to be recognized as a moral partner. They are recognized as equal, rational 
participants in discourse. 
                                                          
2 The development of moral discourse here alluded to only implicitly is probably best compared to MacIntyre’s 
discussion of traditions. I believe his characterization owes much to Hegel as does the idea of progress which 
motivates my own understanding. I do not have space, unfortunately, to argue for it directly in this essay.  See 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), ch. 18. 
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Finally, to fully separate crises from mere disagreement, it is pertinent to identify the 
difference in urgency as concerns its resolution. When Ronald Dworkin wrote about 
pornography he was concerned with free speech and pornography was not a problem as it 
was a minority issue.3 Society was able to tolerate a few perverts for the sake of free speech 
and equality of moral concern.  However, as Langton has pointed out, pornography has 
become pervasive in our culture and its objectification of agents is keenly and widely felt.4  
Everyone now has access to pornography and a resolution to the moral problem of 
pornography is demanded because to ignore it, to sweep it under the carpet, exacerbates the 
conflict and begins to ferment a possible violent outcome. Perhaps because of this urgency, 
crisis as apart from conflict, is often accompanied by or instigates political violence. Issues 
such as the testing of five year olds in school or the issues surrounding assisted suicide, do 
not beget violence because tolerance and compromise can be accommodated. However, 
abortion, equality of genders, races and minorities often result in civil disobedience and direct 
action.5 
To summarize, a moral crisis is (i) a conflict between moral reasons in which (ii) both 
participants appeal to recognized elements and values of a shared moral culture; but it differs 
from a moral disagreement in that (iii) its resolution is urgent.  
 
Conflict and Error 
 
One assumes that of the two opposing participants in a rational conflict, one or both are 
in error. The aim of moral discourse has always been conceived as, on one level, the rational 
negation of erroneous assumptions and arguments. Given the ahistorical, universalist and 
monist nature of modern ethics, such crises are seen as a species of one of three errors.   
One, the error concerns a conflict of interests with moral obligations. Some putative 
moral reasons are not reasons at all but only apparently rational. Instead they are preferences, 
interests and desires and the language which sets them up as reasons is nothing but ideology. 
When a demand is made by the interests of some agents against the moral obligations of all 
agents, then there is a simple conflict between reason and desire. So, the ruling males believe 
they have reasons for not extending votes to women, but these are just masks for their own 
interests. The moral language of such cultures, the language one must speak to be rational is 
revealed to be ideological in the sense that it expresses interests of a class/group exclusively 
and in isolation from society as a whole.6 Rational discourse will reveal which are real 
reasons and which are mere expressions of interests. 
Two, the error arises from badly articulated problems, but problems which are 
ultimately reducible to core moral values. With abortion, we recognize that historical and 
traditional principles of the sanctity of life muddy the discursive water and we really need a 
full blown rights theory and a proper metaphysics that assigns or denies personhood to the 
                                                          
3 Ronald Dworkin, “Is There a Right to Pornography?”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1981, 30.3: 177-212. 
4 Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), chs. 6-7. 
5 There is an interesting aspect to this violence that links it with the issue of recognition. Hegel believes that 
recognition is a long drawn out historical struggle which begins either with individual violent conduct or war 
between states. And it is interesting to note how, prior to violent acts, silencing of other participants is the norm, 
and yet a violent demand results in recognition because the agent is prepared to risk his or her life for the sake of 
a value, thus displaying the Hegelian requirement for rational action. (One feels Emily Davison throwing herself 
in front of the King’s horse  in 1913 is a paradigm example.) See Georg Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. 
A. V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), ¶¶178-183; and Georg Hegel, Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §351R. 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. F. Golffing, (London: Doubleday, 1956) and Karl Marx, 
The German Ideology, trans. S. Ryazanskaya (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998). 
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foetus. Once we have the appropriate language and concepts, the conflict will supposedly 
disappear. 
Three, the result of conceptual or metaphysical error. Reasons have a proper language 
which is universal and required for the rational expression of reasons. Conflict can be due to 
bad articulation and framing of a problem in imprecise and ambiguous language.  In other 
words, because ethics is itself ahistorical and universal, crises must belong to the temporal 
world of change and hence incorporate some sort of error. So, for example, seeing the foetus 
as a soul is an ontological error that has normative consequences for the rational discussion of 
the permissibility of termination. 
In all three cases, moral discourse seeks to bracket off the historical nature of these 
conflicts rendering it insignificant to the actual debate. Crises, though, arise when there is a 
need for revision and reinterpretation of a community’s central values. The value of moral 
crises may well be in their contribution to the project of thinking as they seemingly function 
as a motor of historical-ethical revisionism (as was the case with equality in the suffrage 
demand and liberty in the abortion demand). Ethical crises may occur when the very concepts 
of our ethical reasoning are in need of revision and not just our articulation and expression of 
them. Crises seem to involve a need to develop one’s moral language and so are significantly 
different from simple moral disagreement.   
The nature of modern moral philosophy is apparently an obstruction to conferring the 
appropriate status on moral crises, though. One needs an ethical theory which is sensitive to 
these understandings, yet one which resists the urge to fall into a simple historical relativism 
whereby moral language is relative to the historical culture which grounds it. Most modern 
ethical theories are not. 
 
Historicism of Moral Language 
 
The elements, reasons and values of our moral language are primarily constituted as a 
cultural a priori. These values are imposed by a subject on his or her experience in order to 
make the experience intelligible.7 These values are, for the most part, coexistent and plural. 
One can respect an other's autonomy whilst maximizing overall utility or welfare, but 
sometimes they will conflict. Sometimes it is impossible to be consistent or even to be 
faithful to all our values at once, there is only so much “social space” in our society. 
Sometimes the values will relate to each other illogically and oddly due to their historical 
manifestations. Sometimes new moral problems will often bring into stark relief those 
background values which inform our judgements and force us to re-interrogate them as 
grounds to our moral judgements. Novel ethical issues will force us to evaluate the 
substantial manifestations of equality, liberty and other procedural values or even, at a lower 
level, substantial, historical values. So, for example, abortion is a real moral issue in a society 
where medical technology (where cost is minimized and safety maximized), religious 
traditions (the traditional Christian echo which places the quickening at conception unlike the 
Muslim faith) and women's material equality (women make decisions for themselves) collide 
to raise the problem of re-evaluating the concept of the liberty of a specific group in a 
tradition that has for a long time silenced them. To look at the problem divorced from these 
understandings is to corrupt what is actually at stake. Moral crises are shot through with 
historicity. For Hegel, such moral problems are motors of history and he thinks this is what 
allows us to perfect our moral discourse . 
                                                          
7 I shall not argue for this thesis here. For a discussion and argument, please refer to David E Rose, The Ethics 
and Politics of Pornography (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), ch. 6. 
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Hegel prescribes objective determinations of the will from one's social and cultural 
identity.8 He realizes that the nature of the good cannot be created from the abstract thinking 
of the mind consistent with universal norms. Instead the moral subject must begin from 
existing moral values and institutions because his constraint of objectivity involves the idea 
that the good must be intelligible to the judgements of my cultural peers. Recognition of the 
rightness of my action is necessary for me to be treated as a free agent. Those values the 
agent finds himself thrown into are those that make rational moral thinking possible and are, 
then, the ground of his own evaluation and the starting point of his own revisionary project.  
Moral thinking is a socially immanent enterprise. The substantial understanding of 
others as derived from their social identity and also of oneself is the objective freedom of the 
agent. The objective freedom of an agent is the institutions, moral values, social fabric, roles, 
civil, economic and political structures and so on that guarantee his or her identification as a 
subject of his or own deeds and his or her recognition as a moral agent (and not an animal, a 
very young child, a slave and so on). So, for example, capitalism, the family and the Christian 
tradition are all forms of objective freedom: they assign roles and duties that determine how 
we behave in certain situations and in behaving in accordance with their dictates (or, at times, 
violating them) we are able to be, and also understood as, a moral agent. Such objective 
determinations will differ from age to age, area to area and, as it is constituted by various 
concatenations of class, geography, age and so on, from person to person. 
One simplified way to understand Hegelian ethics is as a one-dimensional relativism: a 
moral assertion is true or false relative to a system and code of values, goods and rules 
institutionalized in a community. Even given the erroneous nature of such an interpretation of 
Hegel (Hegel is not a relativist), such a position has immediate problematic consequences. 
First, the reason why pornography, abortion, euthanasia and environmentalism are widely 
discussed is because there exists no agreed consensus on such issues. Moral crises present 
themselves as problems to be solved because there is no such agreement nor easy way to 
convince those who would espouse contrary statements (as there is when we talk about the 
wrongness of breaking promises and of harming people without good reason, even if we 
disagree on moral theories, metaphysics, politics and religion!) Second, relativism – simply 
because there is no shared consensus – would have nothing to say about such issues and 
would be quietist in ilk. 'Wait for a standard consensus to form and then cohere with it,' is a 
rather uninspiring moral philosophy. Third, there would be no way to make inter-cultural (as 
opposed to intra-cultural) evaluations: I can criticize those like me, but I cannot criticize 
those unlike me as they operate under different values, norms and are products of a different 
history. 
For these reasons, relativism is hugely unappealing but, as I have already said, Hegel is 
no relativist. Moral judgements are not transcendental, or products of a priori thinking, nor 
even laws consistent with the science of human nature. They are contingent, products of an 
historical tradition and cut across the politics, social values and economics of a particular 
community. However, there is a further story to be told. Hegel has two axes of evaluation to 
apply. To the question, 'Is X good or right?' the first dimension (the cultural constraint) is to 
see whether the statement coheres with the centrally agreed and rational values of the culture 
to which the statement is presented, the social and moral fabric of the agent's culture. The 
second axis (the autonomy constraint) asks whether the existence of the institution, practice 
or creed maintains, supports or reproduces a state of affairs that inhibits or supports the 
procedural requirements of modern moral discussion, that is autonomy, independence and 
equality. A society with an institution of slavery is worse than one which does not have such 
                                                          
8 What follows is a very succinct summary of Hegel’s ethical thought as it appears in the pages of Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right. 
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an institution on this model. Of course, it rests with the superior culture to explain why, to 
bring the other culture into line with its thinking and such a task is historical and not merely 
rational: the words require the economic reforms, the aid, the educational system that would 
support them. And such an enlightenment needs to be self-realized and not through an 
operation of putative moral force.9 
Hegel expresses these with two terms of art: the agent's objective freedom consists in 
his or her institutional identities, social roles, traditional values and economic, material 
existence. The question is then why Hegel understands these objective determinations of 
one’s identity as a liberation or a freedom.  These roles and values make possible the agent's 
moral, rational action: they define what is intelligible and what is to be admired and 
admonished. Subjective freedom is the freedom to act in accordance with or to break the 
principles and requirements of one's objective freedom and to satisfy one's own personal 
projects, desires, interests and so on. The agent's subjective freedom is the capacity of the 
agent to achieve what he or she sees as a worthwhile project or a valuable life within the 
limits of the values and requirements of objective freedom. So, not only does the agent ask 
whether or not his or her action is appropriate to the expectations of his or her peers, but also 
whether the expectations of his or her peers are appropriate to him or her. The agent asks 
himself or herself if he or she feels at home in such a culture, whether his or her individuality 
can be adequately respected in such a culture with all its traditions and values. Moral 
language, its concepts and topics, is a form of objective freedom. 
Morally good reasons are those that are justified by the interpersonal values of a culture 
and those in which the subject can find their own autonomy and equality respected through 
the expression of their own freely chosen projects and aspirations. Yet, this still may not be 
enough because human beings immersed in culture can be coerced into believing that they are 
at home in roles which do not violate the procedural limits of moral discourse, but may still 
be morally problematic. Human sacrifice whereby the victim has won the honour of being 
sacrificed in open competition with all members of the community seems to be one such case. 
Therefore, we require one last limit on possible interpretations of the requirements of moral 
behaviour. There are values which are operative in our practical reason that appeal to one’s 
identity not only as a member of a specific class, nor only as a member of a specific society 
nor people, but also and above these as a member of the human race. 
Modern moral philosophy is often challenged by its attempt to obfuscate the distinction 
between obligatory or supererogatory actions, or its requirements being too demanding, or its 
demand for disinterestedness. Moral requirements must be tempered by the integrity of the 
agent, his or her own projects and needs, and ultimately his or her nature, that is the interests 
in self-preservation and a happy life, but they are given sense through the objective freedom 
of moral language. Moral language is an aspect of objective freedom: my personal, subjective 
freedom can be increased or decreased by the institutions of education in my culture but also 
so by the language available to me and the reasons such language embodies. A culture with a 
substantial and robust understanding of autonomy is better for the individual than one with an 
opaque and ambiguous understanding of it. 
We can now, on the basis of the brief outline of Hegel’s social ethical approach, 
describe three axes of moral interpretation. The objective freedom of moral language is 
required for the freedom and rationality of the individual, but it has to meet these 
requirements: 
1. its concepts and practices can be justified to others in terms of publicly shared values 
(the cultural constraint); 
                                                          
9 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §57A. 
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2. the personal roles and practices it prescribes do not violate the basic needs which 
ground the development of all human societies and generate human association (the 
minimal naturalism constraint); 
3. the subject is able to express his or her personal individuality as an ongoing project 
which has been freely endorsed and chosen and is respected by others. The subject is 
able to feel at home in a culture where personal integrity as an individual, expressed 
as his or her autonomy and recognized via respect from others, is possible (the 
autonomy constraint). 
Moral crises occur when either (2) or (3) is made impossible for an individual. The 
impossibility is not just incoherence but a simultaneous urgency for change. However, 
instead of moral language being rejected, one finds that the individuals and groups can make 
an appeal to (a), but so can their opponents; as is the case with slavery or human sacrifice. 
Hence, (1) is not to be rejected but to be refined by the norm of coherence. (1) has to cohere 
with the demands of (2) and (3) to be a form of objective freedom. Female suffrage shows 
how the idea of a self who is autonomous and free and hence has a right to participate in 
government is a requirement of the modern self yet comes into conflict with institutions of 
familial hierarchy. The problem with abortion is the demand that women as well as men are 
entitled to control over their own natures and bodies in line with the demand for autonomy. 
One can now begin to understand this in terms of Marx’s concept of ideology. An 
ideology is the self-understanding of a group or class who sees itself as having interests in 
isolation and separate from the aims of society as a whole.10 With a moral language, it is 
justified as a form of objective freedom, yet when we recognize ourselves as agents with 
interests that are separate from those interests which are permissible and coherent with the 
moral language of our age and yet these interests are coherent with emergent or other values 
and hence demand attention. This cannot be subjective or idiosyncratic because they must be 
expressed in terms which can be grounded in some part of the moral culture. The language of 




Moral crises occur at the level of a culture’s moral language. Either concepts are not yet 
available for the articulation of the problem or the substantial cultural idiom is inconsistent 
with the values of that culture. So, one may not be able to understand the need for autonomy 
(as the Ancient Greeks did not), or the understanding of equality (an equality of an 
ontological distinction) is unable to resolve demands from subjects who are not covered by its 
understanding. Such crises reflect a failure of a culture’s moral language. When the agent 
cannot feel at home in a culture’s moral language because the obligations and requirements of 
that language are incoherent with or violate either other interests and needs rational to the 
culture as a whole or the obligations frustrate the naturalist personal integrity of the agent. At 
such a point, the language of a culture is incoherent and in demand of revision. We do not 
know what moral norms require until we work them out through historical struggle. 
For example, abortion becomes a pertinent moral issue when the demand by women for 
the self-ownership of their bodies and their projects which is consistent with modernity’s 
central values comes into conflict with the traditional basis of moral language, the Christian 
tradition. The crisis is only felt when there is enough surplus wealth and women in 
employment such that the need for self-ownership of one’s body becomes a felt need, rather 
than a theoretical nicety. The resolution of the demand will be the emergence of new moral 
terms and concepts. Moral crisis are not the protest of the unreasonable or the irrational, but 
                                                          
10 Marx, The German Ideology, pp. 34-43. 
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the immanent voice of those who seek what the moral culture promises. Thus, a true moral 
crisis occurs when the group subject cannot feel at home in the moral language of their 
culture.11 Examples would include the Suffragettes, animal rights activists, environmentalists 
and anti-capitalists. All these groups for a “we” subject” and articulate their claims in terms 
of values shared by the dominant moral majority. So, the anti-capitalists for example appeal 
to the need for personal autonomy which was the supposed justification of private property 
by the liberal tradition (and Hegel himself). They cannot just be silenced or termed irrational. 
All that has been shown here is that it may be a mistake to reduce moral crises to 
conceptual errors or simple moral conflicts. They are a specific phenomenon and one that 
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11 It must be a group. Luther and Socrates are idiosyncratic and unique. They are what Hegel calls world 
historical individuals. They basically appear when moral discourse has broken down completely not when it is 
need of revision. A group is important for crisis because one requires others, even a small minority, to recognize 
the rationality of one’s claims and to share them against the moral majority. 
